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SOME LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
EUROPEAN WAR
The sudden outbreak of war among five great European
powers gave rise to many questions affecting the liability of
citizens of our own country in their commercial dealings with
inhabitants of the belligerent countries, some of which may be
of interest to the readers of this Review.
During the two or three weeks of the mobilization of armies
in France, Austria, Russia and Germany, when all communica-
tion by telegraph or post was cut off from large portions of
those countries, these questions presented themselves in acute
form, and required the determination by residents of this country
of a course of action in the face of the extraordinary condition
of affairs then existing, which threatened serious legal liability
in whatever event might be the outcome.
Agents in America, cut off from all communication with their
European principals, were compelled, on their own responsibility,
to take action concerning the business of their agency and the
performance of contracts with, or made by them on behalf of
their foreign principals.
Certain legal principles had been settled in cases growing out
of wars in the past, by the application of which conclusions were
reached as to these problems of 1914 with a certain degree of
confidence. While the general rule is that agents must strictly
adhere to the instructions of their principals and only act within
the scope of the powers expressly conferred, or necessary to the
carrying out of the principals' instructions, in the face of unfore-
seen circumstances, agents have been held to be vested with
discretionary powers, and to be liable for the exercise of such
powers only where guilty of gross negligence or fraudulent
conduct.' Even where specific instructions are given by the
principal, if it become impossible to comply with them, and com-
munication with the principal cannot be had within the time
allowed for action, the agent is held to be invested with authority
to do for his principal that which a prudent man would do for
the reasonable protection of his own interests under the given
circumstances. 2 This principle was enunciated and applied by
'Leotard v. Graves, 3 Caines (N. Y.) 225.
'Judson v. Sturges, 5 Day (Conn.) 559; Druntnond v. Wood, 2 Caines
(N. Y.) 31o.
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Mr. Justice Story, on the circuit, in a case which is frequently
cited and relied upon as establishing the law on this point2 The
facts in that case were that a cargo of flour had been shipped
from Boston to South America in charge of a supercargo. Part
of it was sold in Rio Janeiro and the remainder carried to Monte-
video, but the market at that place being unfavorable, the super-
cargo concluded to carry it to Batavia. He did so and there
delivered it to the plaintiff, a merchant, to sell and invest the
proceeds, together with the proceeds of the flour sold in South
America, for the benefit of the shipper. The market at Batavia
was glutted; the flour was somewhat damaged, but the plaintiff
succeeded in selling it on six months' credit, himself advanced
the amount of the price, and invested it in coffee, which he con-
signed to the Boston shipper by whom it was received, without
knowledge of the fact that the flour had been sold on credit. The
purchaser of the flour became insolvent and unable to pay the
purchase price, and the Batavia merchant thereupon brought
suit against the Boston shipper and recovered the amount so
advanced. Mr. Justice Story, in charging the jury, referred
to the fact that the shipper's instructions in their terms only con-
templated sales of the cargo in South America, and then said:
"It turned out, however, that the flour could not all
be sold at the South American ports, or at least not sold,
unless at an enormous sacrifice. The parties had not
looked for any such event. What then was it the duty
of the supercargo to do, in such a case of unexpected
occurrence not within the contemplation of the instruc-
tions? Was he to sacrifice the flour, or throw it over-
board? No one pretends that it was intended to be
brought back to the United States under any circum-
stances. It would probably have been spoiled and ruined
on the return voyage and come home actually worthless.
Now I take it to be clear that if, by some sudden emer-
gency, or supervening necessity, or other unexpected
event, it becomes impossible for the supercargo to comply
with the exact terms of his instructions, or a literal com-
pliance therewith would frustrate the objects of the owner,
and amount to a total sacrifice of his interests, it becomes
the duty of the supercargo, under such circumstances, to
do the best he can, in the exercise of a sound discretion,
to prevent a total loss to his owner; and if he acts bona
fide, and exercises a reasonable discretion, his acts will
bind the owner. He becomes, in such case, an agent from
necessity for the power."
'Forrester v. Boardnzan, I Story 43.
29
YALE LAW JOURNAL
As the Supreme Court of Massachusetts pointed out in apply-
ing this decision to the case of a consignment of hay during the
civil war by owners in Maine to commission merchants in Louis-
iana, which the latter sold and, yielding to the military exigencies
of the time, took payment for in the only thing they could get,
certificates of indebtedness, worth less than par,
- . . "the interests of commerce require, and the enlight-
ened principles of commercial law bestow, a discretion
which enables the factor to protect his principal from the
irreparable injury which would be liable to arise in the
absence of authority to act under critical circumstances,
unexpectedly occurring, which do not admit of delay for
the purposes of communication and consideration. And
the factor, so placed, who acts prudently, and in good
faith, as the owner himself, being a wise man, would have
been likely to do if personally present, finds his protec-
tion in the sincerity and sound discretion of his conduct,
and is not answerable for consequences, although subse-
quent events may demonstrate that his principal would
have been the gainer by a different course from the one
he has conscientiously and discreetly adopted." 4
The same principle is applicable not only to factors but to
every other species of agency.
The English courts put the authority of the agent in such a
contingency squarely upon the impossibility of communicating
with the principal.5 This considerati6n, therefore, was regarded
as applicable to those cases where American houses on behalf
of European principals prior to the outbreak of war on August
I, 1914, had entered into contracts for the purchase or sale of
stocks, or of such commodities as, e. g., wheat, corn or other
comestibles, and where, owing to tie decline in value of collat-
erals pledged as margins to protect them from loss in carrying
the same for their principals, they were threatened with serious
loss, and were cut off from communication with their European
principals. Even where a stock broker himself has advanced
money to purchase a stock for a customer, to be carried on
margin, the general rule of law is that he must not close out
"Greenleaf v. Moody, 13 Allen 363, 368. See Mechem on Agency, 2d
ed., 718 and note.
'See Guilliam v. Twist, 2 Q. B. 84; Hawtayne v. Bourne, 7 M. & W.
595, cited in Mechem, supra.
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the transaction without the principal's authority, unless, after
reasonable notice, the latter fails to keep good the margin.'
But where it is impossible to communicate with the principal,
and delay means serious loss, the agent becomes invested with
powers of necessity as established in the cases above cited,7 and
may act as reasonable, prudent men would do in the conduct of
their own business under the same conditions.
The closing of the New York exchanges on August 1, 1914,
and the consequent suspension of all trading in stocks and in
commodities dealt in on the Produce, Cotton, and other mercantile
exchanges, led to the adjustment by the appropriate committees
of those exchanges, without litigation of many questions involv-
ing the principles here discussed. Other controversies were
adjusted by agreement after communication was restored between
the United States and the countries at war, but it would be
unsafe to predict that litigation may not yet arise out of the
conditions produced by the sudden outbreak of war, which will
require the application of some of the principles here discussed.
Different principles were brought into operation where the
war actually prevented one of the parties from carrying out
contracts made in the United States to be performed in European
countries.
It is well settled, as a general rule, that the fact that a contract
becomes impossible of performance by reason of the particular
circumstances is not a legal excuse for non-performance. Still
less will unexpected expense, difficulty, or inconvenience short
of impossibility serve as an excuse."
The exception to this rule is that where performance is pre-
vented by the act of God, or vis major, the party liable to
performance is excused. Pollock has defined vis major as "An
event which, as between the parties, and for the purpose of
the matter in hand, cannot be definitely foreseen or controlled."
The existence of war in the country where the contract is to
be performed is held not to excuse performance by a citizen
Content v. Banner, 184 N. Y. 121; Baker v. Drake, 66 N. Y. 518;
Rothschild v. Allen, go App. Div. (N. Y.) affd. i8o N. Y. 561. See
Richardson v. Shaw, 2o9 U. S. 365.
'Jarvis v. Hoyt, 2 Hun (N. Y.) 637.




of our own country unless so stipulated in the contract "because
he might have provided against it by the contract."' 0
The leading case in England is 'Paradine v. Jane, Alleyn 26,
where the Court said:
"When the party by his own contract creates a duty
or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good if
he may, notwithstanding any accident or inevitable neces-
sity, because he might have guarded against it by his
contract." 11
The existence of a state of war between the countries of the
respective parties to a contract does, however, sometimes operate
to suspend or dissolve a contract, not because performance of
it is thereby made difficult, dangerous or impossible, but because
war makes intercourse between the belligerents illegal, and there-
fore the performance of a continuing contract becomes illegal.
But even then, the tendency of later decisions is only to suspend
the part of a contract the performance of which necessarily
violates the duty of allegiance to the state, while those parts
which do not so violate that duty must be carried out.'
2
While the acts of the Sovereign of one of the parties to the
contract may excuse him from performance, under the law of
his own country, the acts of an alien Sovereignty will not excuse
him unless so agreed in the contract. This has been adjudged
where an embargo or quarantine maintained by a foreign govern-
ment has prevented the delivery of cargo or led to the arrest
or detention of ships."3
In deciding a suit for breach of contract to furnish a cargo
to and from Gibraltar, where after the cargo was unloaded at
that port, all public intercourse was forbidden because of a
pestilence, Lord Ellenborough stated the rules in the following
language:
"If indeed the performance of this covenant had been
rendered unlawful by the government of this country, the
West v. Uncle Sam, Fed. Cas. 17427, McAll. 505; Elsey v. Stamps, 78
Tenn. 709.
'Cited and relied on in Jacksonville, &c. Ry. Co. v. Hooper, i6o U. S.
514, 527.
'Owen, Declaration of War, 417; Mutual Benev. Life Ins. Co. v.
Billyard, 37 N. J. L. 444.
"Duff v. Lawrence, 3 Johns. 162; Barker v. Hodgson, 3 M. & S. 270;
Jacobs v.' Credit Lyonnais, 12 Q. B. Div. 589; Spencer v. Chadwick,
L. R. I0, Q. B. 517; Sjoerbs v. Luscontbe, 16 East 2Ol.
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contract would have been dissolved on both sides, and
this defendant, inasmuch as he had been thus compelled
to abandon his contract, would have been excused for
the non-performance of it, and not liable to damages;
but if, in consequence of events which happen at a foreign
port, a freighter is prevented from furnishing a load there,
which he has contracted to furnish, the contract is neither
dissolved, nor is he excused for not performing it, but
must answer in damages."' 4
An exception to this general rule exists in the case of a
blockade of a vessel's port of destination. The law of England
and the United States is that that fact relieves the shipmaster
of the duty of performance and places on him the duty to use
his best judgment as to the disposal of the cargo. He may
recover freight according to the benefit the shipper derives from
the master's services, but neither party may recover damages
for delay resulting from a blockade. 5
Some of these principles were relied upon to determine ques-
tions which were presented by the outbreak of the war, affecting
the payment in European countries of interest or principal of
corporate obligations. Railroad and other corporations had
issued bonds in very large amounts which, by their terms, were
payable in London, Paris, Berlin and other European cities, at
stipulated rates of exchange. The war occurring August first,
arrangements previously had been made for the payment of the
interest due on that date. Some interest was payable September
first and a larger amount October first, which had to be provided
for. During the first three weeks in August, where exchange
was purchasable at all upon European continental capitals, it was
at rates prohibitive of normal business relations, yet in cases
where the debtor companies had deposited funds in America
with the trustees under trust deeds, or with fiscal agents under
agreements whereby the latter had undertaken to provide the
necessary funds to meet maturing coupons and bonds in Euro-
pean capitals, the liability of these institutions became a matter
of some concern. The moratorium issued in certain of the
European countries operated to prevent actions being brought
there by holders of bonds or coupons to enforce their payment,
but it was suggested that the failure to remit and have on hand
at the designated agency in European places moneys sufficient
1 Barker v. Hodgson, 3 M. & S. 270.
2 The Spartan, 25 Fed. 44; Palmer v. Lorrillard, 16 Johns 348; Abbott's
Law of Merchants, Shippers & Seamen, I4th ed., p. 878.
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to meet the maturing obligations might affect the credit of the
obligors and furnish a basis for actions against the trustees or
fiscal agents in this country, and reference was made to the
rule above cited that the existence of war is no excuse for non-
performance of contracts, unless where the war exists between
the countries of the parties to the confract.
In some cases, contracts between the trustee or fiscal agent
and the debtor corporation required the former to deposit a
certain number of days before the maturity of the principal or
interest of its obligations, a sum sufficient to meet them when
due, and the trustee or fiscal agent thereupon agreed to publish
notice in designated European capitals to the effect that payment
would be made at the specified places and offices on the agreed
date, such notices to be published in a certain number of news-
papers a given number of weeks prior to such due date; and
it was mooted whether or not after August Ist, under the existing
conditions, advertisements, the publication of which had been
commenced pursuant to such agreements, should be discontinued.
Later on, when it became possible to communicate with the con-
tinental countries, and to cause advertisements to be inserted
in newspapers in accordance with the contracts, it was queried
whether or not such notices should be published, in view of
the strong probability that it would be impossible to remit the
necessary funds to make payment in accordance therewith, except
at rates of exchange which would be practically prohibitive. The
best opinion seemed to be that it was the duty of the fiscal agent
or Trustee to carry forward the contract so far as possible, in
order that when he came to plead and rely upon impossibility
of further performance he at least might not himself have failed
to perform something which was wholly within his power,
although at the time of such performance it seemed as though
it were futile and even amounted to making promises which it
was probable he could not perform. As a matter of fact, how-
ever, so far as the writer has been able to learn, in all these
cases it became possible, without undue expense, to comply with
the contract provisions at the maturities of the respective obliga-
tions; but in the early days of August, the probabilities were
all the other way. That in the event it became feasible to per-
form the contracts, confirms the wisdom of complying with their
terms so far as possible and of not seeking to justify a breach
by the forecast of a result which was "on the lap of the Gods."
GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM.
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